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Abstract
Public key infrastructure provides a promising founda-
tion for verifying the authenticity of communicating par-
ties and transferring trust over the internet. The key issue
in public key infrastructure is how to process certificate
revocations. Previous research in this aspect has con-
centrated on the tradeoffs that can be made among dif-
ferent revocation options. No rigorous efforts have been
made to understand the probability distribution of certifi-
cate revocation requests based on real empirical data.
In this study, we first collect real empirical data from
VeriSign and derive the probability function for certifi-
cate revocation requests. We then prove that a revocation
system will become stable after a period of time. Based
on these, we show that different certificate authorities
should take different strategies for releasing certificate
revocation lists for different types of certificate services.
We also provide the exact steps by which certificate au-
thorities can derive optimal releasing strategies.
1 Introduction
The introduction of world wide web technology has re-
sulted in a faster and easier exchange of information. It
also exacerbate the problems of verifying the authenticity
of communicating parties and transferring trust over the
internet. The public key infrastructure (PKI) has been
considered as a promising foundation for solving these
problems, especially in the context of secure electronic
commerce. Since the authenticity of PKI is achieved
through the verification of digital certificates, it is crucial
to understand the nature of digital certificates in practice.
Digital certificates have been supported by a wide
range of entities. For example, Korean Government in-
vested heavily on promoting digital certificates to the
public. The digital certificates have been issued for vari-
ous applications such as internet banking, government e-
procurement and stock exchange.2 In the year 2001, the
Ministry of Information and Communication announced
that the total number of users of PKI would reach to 10
million by the year 2002. Korea also made its own 128
bit encryption algorithm called SEED and encouraged all
financial services to use it. It also developed a national
certificate system based on public key infrastructure.3
Unfortunately the glory of the PKI can be so dimmed
if there is no efficient way to verify the validity of digi-
tal certificates. Checking the authenticity and expiration
date of a digital certificate is never sufficient enough as
it is possible that a certificate has been revoked before its
expiration for various reasons, such as 1) key compro-
mise, 2)certificate authority (CA) compromise, 3) affili-
ation change, 4) superseded, or 5) cessation of operation
[6]. To make PKI a useful platform, it is critical to man-
age the certificate revocations efficiently.
Previous research has concentrated on the trade-offs
that can be made among different revocation options
[6, 13, 15]. The purpose is to see which revocation
mechanism is more efficient in which scenario. In or-
der to compare the performance of different mechanisms,
people ran simulations based on theoretical assumptions.
For example, Naor and Nissim calculated the communi-
cation cost by assuming a fixed length of certificate re-
vocation list (CRL). Cooper [2] and Arnes [1] modeled
the distribution of revocation information by assuming
an exponential inter-arrival probability for the requests
for CRLs. To the best of our knowledge, no rigorous
efforts have been made to understand the probability dis-
tribution of certificate revocation requests based on real
empirical data.
Another key conclusion of previous research is that
CA should release CRLs at a fixed time interval because
consumers may not need the most current CRL. As long
as a user has a CRL that is recent enough to meet its
operational requirement, it is acceptable in practice [8].
Rivest [13] has proposed that the recency requirement
should be set by customers, rather than CAs. Unfortu-
nately, all the conclusions are based on some theoreti-
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cal arguments, there is a lack of guidance for CA op-
erations. Given a recency requirement to be set by the
consumers, CA must understand the following aspects
for setting an optimal CRL releasing policy: 1) Why CA
needs to follow a given time interval? Will the interval
be the same for a new type of certificates versus a type
of certificates that has been provided by CA for a certain
period of time? 2) Will the interval be the same for a
mature CA versus a Start-up CA? 3) If CA does follow a
given CRL releasing interval, how does it know whether
that interval is optimal or not?
In this paper, we study how often should a CA release
its CRLs. We concentrate our analysis on CRL because it
is the most common and simplest method for certificate
revocation [6]. We have several interesting findings: 1)
Contrary to the common sense, the probability that a cer-
tificate being revoked is a decreasing function over the
certificate’s life cycle. People tend to think this proba-
bility either flat over time (as memory-less Poisson) or
increasing over time. 2) CA should take different strate-
gies for publishing certificate revocation lists when deal-
ing with a new type of certificates versus a re-serving
type of certificates. 3) A mature CA and a start-up CA
should also take different strategies for releasing CRLs.
4) We give an optimal releasing interval prescription for
CA to balance the trade-off between cost and risk. In a
very general case, a mature CA who deals with just one
type of certificates can save almost 400,000 dollars more
over one-year operation if it follows our strategy by de-
ceasing its CRL releasing interval from 34 days to 17
days.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: First, we
briefly review the major concerns about the public key re-
vocation. We then discuss empirically how to collect data
and derive the revocation distribution. Next, based on
the empirical distribution, we give CA an optimal CRL
releasing strategy. Finally we conclude our paper with
a discussion of contributions, limitations, and future re-
search directions.
2 Literature Review
Since its introduction, the public key infrastructure [5]
has provided a promising foundation for verifying the au-
thenticity of public keys and for transferring trust among
users or business partners. The major issue in PKI is
how to revoke a certificate before its expiration. It has
been argued that the running expenses of a PKI de-
rive mainly from administering revocation [14]. Vari-
ous mechanisms have been designed to achieve efficient,
timely, and scalable revocation of certifications [15, 6].
The certificate revocation list (CRL) mechanism was
introduced in 1988 and since then it remains the most
common and simplest method for certificate revocation.
A CRL is a time-stamped list of certificates which have
been revoked before their expiration. A CA issues a
signed CRL periodically so as to maintain a good syn-
chronization between certificate users and revocation
source. Some extensions of CRL include delta-CRL
(which only carries changes from previous CRL), parti-
tioned CRL (which is partitioned into a family of CRLs),
and indirect-CRL (which can be issued by different CA
than issuer of certificates). Rivest proposed to use short-
lived certificates so as to eliminate CRLs [13]. The major
drawbacks of this approach include a high burden placed
on certificate servers which need to sign more certifi-
cates, as well as the problem of key compromise which
cannot be addressed without using a separate mechanism
[9].
Micali introduced the certificate revocation system
(CRS) which is different from CRL. In CRS, a CA signs
a fresh list of all not-yet-expired certificates together with
selected hash chain values. A user sending a request re-
garding the validity of a single certificate will get a re-
sponse including two hash chain values. The hash chain
values can be used to verify whether the queried certifi-
cate is valid or not for a certain time interval. The major
advantage of this method is that the verification process
is very efficient, thus can be performed on-line. How-
ever, as pointed out by Naor and Nissim [11], the main
disadvantage of this system is the increase of the CA’s
communication cost.
The certificate revocation tree (CRT) mechanism was
suggested by Kocher [7] which can be used by a verifier
of a certificate to obtain a short proof if the certificate
has not been revoked. A CRT is a hash tree whose leaf
nodes correspond to a set of statements about certificates
status. The set of statements provides information about
whether a certificate is revoked or not. A proof for a cer-
tificate status consists of an appropriate path in the hash
tree (from the root to a leaf) specifying for each node the
values of its children. With CRT, a user may hold a short
proof for the validity of his certificate such that the entire
CRL is not necessary for verifying the status of the cer-
tificate. The drawback of CRT is its maintenance cost.
Any change to the set of revoked certificates may cause
re-computation of the entire CRT.
An alternative to the CRL mechanism is to use on-line
certificate status protocol (OCSP) to reduce the latency
between a revocation report and the distribution of revo-
cation information to users [10]. Once a CA accepts a
revocation report, any query (OCSP request) to the sta-
tus of one or more certificates will be correctly answered
by an on-line validation server (OCSP responder) with
relevant status values (good, revoked, or unknown) and
valid intervals. Though OCSP provides more timely re-
vocation services, it imposes new security requirements
as the certificate validators shall trust the on-line valida-
tion service.
Besides the above mechanisms, researchers have stud-
ied various aspects of certificate revocations including
the meaning of revocation [3, 4], the model of revoca-
tion [2], communication cost of revocation [11], trade-
offs in certificate revocation schemes [16], and risk man-
agement in certificate revocation [8]. Though various
tradeoffs have been studied for different revocation op-
tions, no attempt has been made to understand the proba-
bility distribution of request for certificate revocation. In
this paper, we conduct such research for CRL releasing
mechanism based on real data, and give concrete guid-
ance for the optimal operation of CA in various scenar-
ios.
3 Problem Formulation
In this paper, we study how often should a CA release its
CRLs. There are several key assumptions in our study:
1) This is a monopoly case, which means either there is
just one CA in the system or different CAs provide dif-
ferent types of certificate services. So CAs do not need
to consider the competition effect. 2) CA already decides
the issued age of a given type of certificates, where issued
age is defined as the time difference between the expired
date and the issued date. 3) To get started, we assume
CA issues one type of certificates with the same issued
age. These certificates are independent and identical in
terms of risk and cost. Later we will move on to more
general cases.
Given all of the assumptions, the goal of CA is to find
out about how often it should release a CRL to mini-
mize its operational cost over a given period. Here we
define “how often” as the optimal time interval between
two successive CRLs being released, and the “opera-
tional cost” as the sum of variable cost, fixed cost, and
liability cost as defined below.
Normally CA takes a batch process for CRL release.
There is a trade-off between cost and risk. In the case
that consumer files a revocation request to CA but CA
does not release a CRL on time, we assume that CA will
bear the liability cost if there is any damage occurred be-
tween request filing and CRL releasing. Each time CA
releases a CRL, it incurs both fixed cost component and
variable cost component. The fixed cost does not change
with the length of CRL. It indicates a fixed dollar amount
each time CA spends for releasing one CRL, regardless
of the number of certificates in that CRL. Variable cost is
the cost associated with processing each individual cer-
tificate revocation request.
If CA releases the CRL too often, its liability cost is
low, but its fixed cost and variable cost will be high. On
the other hand, the saving on fixed cost and variable cost
might not be offset by the increasing liability cost if CA
Parameter Meaning of Parameter
a Max number of days between two successive CRL released dates
that is accepted by customers.
b The average percentage of certificates revoked among that type
of certificates issued.
c The number of days between two CRL releasing dates.
t Time parameter in the function of R(t),which is R(t)=ke−kt.
∆t Time interval between two generations of CRLs.
X Date on which certificates get issued.
k Parameter in the function of R(t),which is R(t) = ke−kt.
n Numbers of generations.
v Any time between 0 and∞ in the f(v),F(v), and P(v).
d The upper bound of the number of certificate revocations in one
CRL which is allowed by CA, before it releases the CRL.
q The number of CRLs that CA will published during period β .
i The ith CRL published by CA.
Ndi CA releases the CRL on the Ndi day.
α Number of certificates issued at different times.
β Issued Age of CRL, which is equal to Expired Date Minus Issued
Date.
µ Shape parameter in Poisson distribution which indicates the av-
erage number of certificate revocations in a given time interval.
λ Number of certificate revocations in CRL on the day β for Pois-
son case.
θ Stable number of certificates in CRL on a given day after β if CA
decides to release CRL on that day.
FC The fixed cost of CA for publishing one CRL.
V C The constant unit cost of CA for including one certificate into the
CRL.
Υ The expected risk/liability per revocation cost for CA for delay-
ing publish that revocation for one day
f(v) The number of new certificate revocations between day v and day
v+∆t.
F (v) The valid cumulative number of certificate revocations from time
1 to v.
P (v) The percentage of certificate revocations occurred from time v to
time v+∆ t.
Table 1: Notation
releases the CRL too rarely. So CA needs to find an op-
timal interval for CRL release. In order to find this solu-
tion, CA must know the CRL length on a given day if it
decides to publish CRL on that day. The length of CRL
at any time t is related to three components: 1) Length
of CRL at any time t− 1. 2) How many revoked certifi-
cates including in the CRL at time t − 1 will be expired
at time t. According to CRL policy, if the certificate is
expired, it should be excluded from CRL. 3) How many
new revocation requests it will receive from time t− 1 to
t.
For ease of reference, Table 1 lists all the notation that
will be used in this paper.
4 Data Collection
How many new revocation requests a CA received from
time t − 1 to t is really driven by the probability distri-
bution of certificate revocation requests. From Septem-
ber 7th to September 13th , we collected a series of
CRLs from VeriSign.com. As one of the biggest Cer-
tificate Authority in the world, VeriSign provides variant
types of certificates and publishes different CRLs period-
ically. We randomly choose five different CRL files from
VeriSign website, which belong to five different classes.
Table 2 provides the descriptions for these 5 CRL files
which have 39,243 total revocation records. When a cer-
tificate is issued, its validity is limited by an expiration
date. Note that the definition of issued age is:
Issued Age = Expired Date− Issued Date
However, there are circumstances where a certificate
must be revoked prior to its expiration date. Thus, the
truly existence age of the certificate is the time between
the issued date and the revoked date.
Existence Age = Revoked Date− Issued Date
A certificate is valid for its issued age unless it is revoked.
Each revoked certificate in a CRL is identified by its cer-
tificate serial number and the revoked date. Based on
the serial number of a given certificate, we searched the
VeriSign online database to get both the issued date and
the expired date correspondingly. We cleaned those er-
ror records whose revoked date was later than the expired
date or whose issued date was later than the revoked date.
5 Data Analysis
We present the summary statistics for our data in Table
3. The average issued age of these CRLs is 493 days,
while the average existence age is much shorter, only 31
days. To further demonstrate what is happening here,
we plot the number of revocations against existence age
in Figure 1, and the percentage of revocations against
existence age in Figure 2 for classes RSASecureServer
and SVRIntl.
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Figure 1: Number of revocations vs. existence age
The most interesting finding is that most of the certifi-
cate revocations occur at the first few days after issued,
and the percentage of revocations decreases with elapsed
time. More than 30% of revocations occur within the
first two days after certificates get issued. This distribu-
tion pattern is very robust, and it is insensitive to which
CRLs we investigated and which years we selected. It
still holds when we pool five CRLs together.
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64 72 80 88 96 10
4
11
2
12
0
Existence  Age (day)
RSASecureServer
SVRIntl
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 
o
f R
e
vo
ca
tio
n
Figure 2: Probability of revocation vs. existence age
5.1 Empirical Model
In order to get the size of CRL at any time t, we must
know the behavior of the probability density function
(PDF) of certificate revocations over time. In the above,
empirically we already show that the percentage of re-
vocations decreases with elapsed time. Next statistically
we derive the underline PDF.
5.1.1 Underline PDF for Certificates Issued at a
Particular Time
We assume that there are α certificates issued at time X
with issued age β. To get start, we assume that α is a
constant number. Later we change α to a random num-
ber with a Poisson distribution to study the more general
case. From time X to time X+β, on average αb% of the
certificates will be revoked. At time X+β, all the certifi-
cates issued at time X will be expired, no matter whether
they have been revoked or not. Let R(t) be the proba-
bility that any given certificate issued at time X will be
revoked in the interval [t, t+∆t], where t is between X
and X + β. It also represents the revoked percentage,
which is the number of revocations occurred in the inter-
val [t, t+∆t] divided by the total number of revocations
occurred between X and X + β (i.e., αb%). Following
the empirical distribution observed in Figure 2, we use
an exponential probability density function to model this
distribution.
R(t) = ke−kt (1)
We use Maximum Absolute Deviation (MAD) to de-
termine the parameter k. The MAD is proposed by
Kolmogorov-Smirnov. It minimizes the largest gap be-
tween the cumulative relative frequency of a given data
set and that of its fitted statistical distribution. In Figure
3, we present both the real empirical data and theoreti-
cally fitted PDF4. The PDF fits the empirical data very
well when the parameter k is equal to 0.26, which is ac-
cepted at a 99% confidence interval.
File Name Issuer Publishing Time Purpose No.of
Items
Max Ex-
istence
Age
(day)
Signature
Algo-
rithm
Class3Code
Sign-
ing2001.crl
VeriSign Class 3 Code
Signing 2001 CA
September 04,
2005 6:00:08 PM
Code signing and object signing certificates used
for Netscape browsers, Microsoft Internet Explorer
browsers, Microsoft Office, Sun Java Signing,
Macromedia, and Marimba.
1,993 380 md5RSA
CSC3-
2004.crl
VeriSign Class 3 Code
Signing 2004 CA
September 11,
2005 6:00:25 PM
Same as VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2001 except
used for certificates with different expiration date.
228 364 md5RSA
Class3
NewOFX.cr
VeriSign Class 3 Open
Financial Exchange
CA
September 11,
2005 6:00:15 PM
Open financial exchange certificates, used for au-
thenticating and securing commerce on the Internet.
515 302 md5RSA
RSASecure
Server.crl
RSA Secure Server CA September 08,
2005 6:00:25 PM
Secure server certificates used by a Root CA for
managing PKI for SSL Customers and VTN Affili-
ates.
14,837 727 md5RSA
SVRIntl.crl VeriSign International
Server CA Class 3
September 08,
2005 6:00:16 PM
Global server certificates for managing PKI for SSL
(Premium Edition) customers and VTN Affiliates.
21,839 720 md5RSA
Table 2: Descriptions of CRL files
Items Issued Age(Unit:Day) Existence Age(Unit:Day)
Mean 493 31
Median 366 5
Max 1173 727
Min 1 0
Q3 730 21
Q1 365 1
Table 3: Summary statistics
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Figure 3: Empirical data vs. fitted exponential PDF
5.1.2 First Case: A Model for Pooling Certificates
Issued at Different Time
In the previous section, we only consider the PDF of one
population of certificates issued at time X. Now consider
that CA issues certificates at different time. Each gener-
ation of certificates is composed of certificates issued at
a particular time with the same issued age β, where the
time interval between two successive generations is ∆t.
At any given time interval [t, t + ∆t], the revocation re-
quests CA received originate from different generations.
In order for CA to decide when to release the CRLs,
on daily basis CA must know: 1) The number of new
revocation requests; and 2) The size of the CRL if it de-
cides to release the CRL on that day. Based on the PDF
derived from the previous section, we build a model to
compute the total number of certificate revocations when
pooling revocations from different generations.
The number of new revocation requests The PDFs
of revocations from different generations of certificates
follow the same exponential probability density R(t) =
ke−kt as shown in Figure 4. Suppose that v is any time
in (0, β]. Let f(v) be the number of new certificate re-
vocations between day v and day v +∆t, from all of the
valid generations.
f(v) = αb%R(v) + αb%R(v −∆t) +
αb%R(v − 2∆t) + . . .+
αb%R[v − (n− 1)∆t] (2)
where n is the number of generations in time period β;
that is, n = d β∆te.
Assuming that ∆t is one day, and that v is an integer,
where v is in (0, β], then we get the following equation.
f(v) = αb%R(1)+αb%R(2) + . . .+αb%R(v)
= αb%ke−k+αb%ke−2k + . . .+αb%ke−vk
= αb%ke−k
1− e−vk
1− e−k (3)
When v is in (β,∞), we have
f(v) = αb%R(1)+αb%R(2) + . . .+αb%R(β)
= αb%ke−k+αb%ke−2k + . . .+αb%ke−βk
= αb%ke−k
1− e−βk
1− e−k (4)
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Figure 4: Model for pooling revocations from different
generations
Equations 3 and 4 show that the number of new re-
vocation requests CA received on daily basis increases
with a decreasing rate as time elapses from day zero until
day β. After that, the number of revocation requests on
daily basis becomes a constant number. Figure 5 shows
the number of new certificate revocations on daily basis
in (0, 2β] for the case where α = 1000, b% = 10%,
k = 0.26, and β = 36 days. From now on we omit the
graph for (mβ, (m + 1)β], where m ≥ 2, because the
shape in those regions are the same as that in (β, 2β].
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Figure 5: f(v) behavior: the number of new certificate
revocations on daily basis
The Size of CRL The CRL, if issued on day v, in-
cludes the new revocation requests on day v as well as
the valid historical revocation requests (occurred before
day v) whose expiration day is later than v. Let F (v)
be the valid cumulative number of certificate revocations
from time 1 to v, where “valid” means not expired. This
is also the size for the CRL if CA decides to publish it on
that day. For any time v ∈ (0, β], we have
F (v) =
v∑
t=1
f(t) =
v∑
t=1
αb%ke−k
1− e−tk
1− e−k
=
αb%ke−k
1− e−k [v −
e−k
1− e−k (1− e
−vk)] (5)
Considering the (β + 1) day, the revoked certificates
from the first generation are expired, and thus removed
from the CRL. At this time, the number of valid genera-
tions is (β + 1)− 1 = β.
Considering the (β + 2) day, revocation from the first
two generations are expired, and thus removed from the
CRL. At that time the number of valid generations is also
(β + 2)− 2 = β.
The rest may be deduced similarly. For any v ∈
(β,+∞), we have
F (v) = F (β) =
β∑
t=1
f(t)
=
αb%ke−k
1− e−k [β −
e−k
1− e−k (1− e
−βk)] (6)
Equations 5 and 6 show that the size of CRL on daily
basis with respect to time is a convex function. It in-
creases with an increasing rate as time elapses from day
0 until the time reaches issued age β. After that, the size
of CRL becomes a constant number. The reason it is
not going to be infinite is that at any time some revoked
certificates may be expired and removed from CRL. Fig-
ure 6 shows the daily CRL size in (0, 2β] for the case of
α = 1000, b% = 10%, k = 0.26, and β = 36 days.
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Figure 6: F (v) behavior: daily size of CRL
Percentage of revocations Let P (v) be the percentage
of certificate revocations occurred from time v to time
v + ∆t, which is defined as the number of new certifi-
cate revocations at time v divided by the cumulative valid
number of certificate revocations from time 1 to v. For
any time v ∈ (0, β], we have
P (v) = f(v)/
v∑
t=1
f(t)
=
αb%ke−k 1−e
−vk
1−e−k
αb%ke−k
1−e−k [v − e
−k
1−e−k (1− e−vk)]
=
1
v
1−e−vk − e
−k
1−e−k
(7)
For any time v ∈ (β,+∞), the number of new certifi-
cate revocations at time v is always equal to f(β), and the
cumulative valid number of certificate revocations from
time 1 to v is always equal to F (β). Thus,
P (v) = f(β)/
β∑
t=1
f(t)
=
αb%ke−k 1−e
−βk
1−e−k
αb%ke−k
1−e−k [β − e
−k
1−e−k (1− e−βk)]
=
1
β
1−e−βk − e
−k
1−e−k
(8)
Equations 7 and 8 show that the majority of the cer-
tificate revocations occur at early stage of the issued
age of certificates, right after they were issued. Figure
7 shows the graph of percentage of certificate revoca-
tions in (0, 2β] for the case of α = 1000, b% = 10%,
k = 0.26, and β = 36 days.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Time (day)
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f R
ev
oc
at
io
n
Figure 7: P (v) behavior: percentage of revocations
5.1.3 Second Case: Overlap of Certificates with dif-
ferent Issued Ages
In the first case, we assume that CA issues a fixed number
of certificates at different time, but each time it is the
same type of certificates that issued with the same issued
age. Now we relax these assumptions to a more general
case by assuming that at any point of time CA can issue
two types of certificates with different issued ages β1 and
β2, where β2 > β1. We assume that these two types are
independent of each other. Under these assumptions, we
compute the new F (v) and P (v) in different intervals of
(0, β1], (β1, β2], and (β2,+∞) correspondingly.
We overlap two types of certificates with the distribu-
tion functions R1(t) = k1e−k1t and R2(t) = k2e−k2t.
At the same time, each type of certificates is composed
of generations of different certificates issued at different
time.
The size of CRL on daily basis Now the daily CRL
size F (v) is a cumulative number of the revocations of
two types of certificates. For any time v ∈ (0, β1], we
have
F (v) =
v∑
t=1
f1(t) +
v∑
t=1
f2(t) (9)
In the interval (β1, β2], the size of CRL for the certifi-
cates whose issued age is β1 has become stable and the
value of F1(v) will be constant, while that for the certifi-
cates whose issued age is β2 keeps increasing. For any
v ∈ (β1, β2], we have
F (v) = F1(β1) +
v∑
t=1
f2(t) (10)
In the interval (β2,+∞), both CRLs become stable,
and thus
F (v) = F1(β1) + F2(β2) (11)
Figure 8 shows the graph of the cumulative numbers
of valid certificate revocations in (0,+∞) for the case
k1 = 0.26, β1 = 36, k2 = 1, β2 = 72, α1 = 2000,
α2 = 1000, b1 = 10%, and b2 = 10%.
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Figure 8: F (v) behavior: overlap certificates with differ-
ent issued ages
Percentage of Revocations Let P (v) be the percentage
of certificate revocations occurred between v and v+∆t
for the pooling case. For any v ∈ (0, β1], we have
P (v) =
f1(v) + f2(v)∑v
t=1 f1(t) +
∑v
t=1 f2(t)
(12)
For any v ∈ (β1, β2], we have
P (v) =
f1(β1) + f2(v)∑β1
t=1 f1(t) +
∑v
t=1 f2(t)
(13)
For any v ∈ (β2,+∞), we have
P (v) =
f1(β1) + f2(β2)∑β1
t=1 f1(t) +
∑β2
t=1 f2(t)
(14)
Figure 9 shows the graph of percentage of revocations
in interval (0,+∞) for the case k1 = 0.26, β1 = 36,
k2 = 1, β2 = 72, α1 = 2000, α2 = 1000, b1 = 10%
and b2 = 10%. Overall, the behaviors of F (v) and P (v)
are almost the same as those in case 1.
20 40 60 80
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Time (day)
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f R
ev
oc
ai
on
← c1(v)
c2(v)→ ← overlap curve P(v) 
Figure 9: P (v) behavior: overlap certificates with differ-
ent issued ages
5.1.4 Third Case: Simulation in the Case of Poisson
Distribution
In our first case, we assume that CA issues a fixed num-
ber of certificates at different time. A more general case
is that CA issues α certificates, where α is a random
number following a Poisson distribution with parame-
ter µ. For this case, the average number of revocation
requests per interval is µ. The probability that there
are x revocation requests occurred in each interval is
Pµ(x) = µ
xe−µ
x! . Because the explicit forms of f(v) and
F (v) are messy, we uses simulation to get some insights.
We conducted our simulation on a HP 1940 PC (with
Pentium 4 CPU and 1.00GB RAM) using Visual C++.
We follow the steps below in our simulation:
1. Firstly, generate a sequence of random number α1,
α2, α3, . . . , αm based on the value of µ.
2. Secondly, compute the total number of new revo-
cations on daily basis between 1 and 2β, which is
f(v).
3. Thirdly, compute the valid cumulative number of re-
voked certificates from day 1 to day 2β, which is
F (v).
4. At last, generate different groups of random num-
bers for α, repeat step 1 to step 4 for twenty times.
Figure 10 shows a typical case for daily numbers
of new certificate revocations with Poisson distribution
when β = 360 and k = 0.26. The number of new cer-
tificate revocations increases sharply to about 90 within a
very short period of time after the certificates get issued.
Instead of becoming stable as in case 1 and case 2, the
curve fluctuates around 90 after a short period of time.
The oscillation is driven by the randomness introduced
by using Poisson distribution.
Figure 11 shows that F (v) continues increasing from
1 to β, where β = 360. After β, it begins to fluctu-
ate. In a actual business environment, a typical issued
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Figure 10: f(v): daily number of new certificate revoca-
tions with Poisson distribution
age β is 360 days, which is much bigger than ∆t. In
such a case, the stable value of λ in Figure 11 is so large
that it dominates the fluctuation introduced by Poisson.
Consequently, the curve is very smooth after β. This is
consistent to the case 1 when we assume a fixed number
of certificates issued at any point of time. When CA de-
cides how often CRL should be released, it mostly cares
about the distribution of F (v). Because of the existence
of the similarity between the fixed number case and the
Poisson distribution case for the F (v) distribution, later
for our economic analysis, we will focus on the fixed
number case.
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Figure 11: F (v): daily size of CRL with Poisson distri-
bution
5.2 Analytical Model: How Often Should
CA Release CRLs
The key research question in our paper is to give a pre-
scription to CA to decide how often it should release its
CRLs. In order to answer that question, CA must know
the distribution of new certificate revocation f(v) and the
distribution of certificate revocation list F (v). CA needs
to balance the liability cost of not releasing CRL on time
and the fixed and variable costs of releasing CRL too of-
ten. So the goal for CA is to minimize the overall op-
erational cost. Because the behaviors of f(v) and F (v)
when time t is greater than the issued age β are different
from those when time t is smaller than β, we analyze the
optimal strategies for CA for these two cases separately.
For each case we assume a monopoly case so that there
is no competition between CAs, and that the certificates
are homogeneous in terms of risk, cost, and revocation
probability. Also, different types of certificates are inde-
pendent from each other. CA will get an optimal CRL
releasing strategy for each type of certificates based on
properties of the certificates.
5.2.1 Optimal Releasing Strategy When Time is
Greater Than β
When time is greater than β, CA has run certificate ser-
vices for at lease one issued age for that type of certifi-
cates. We will use the following variables in our analysis
(the numbers in parentheses are the default values used
in our computation).
• β: The issued age of one type of CRL. (β = 360)
• c: The estimated number of days between two CRL
releasing dates. This is the decision variable that
CA needs to optimize.
• θ: Estimated numbers of certificates in a CRL on
a given day after issued age β if CA decides to
release CRLs on that day. According to case 1,
θ = F (β) = α·b%·k·e
−k
1−e−k (β− e
−k
1−e−k ). (θ = 32, 000,
k = 0.26, and β = 360)
• FC: The fixed cost for CA to publish one CRL
.(FC = $10, 000)
• V C: The variable cost for CA to include each in-
dividual certificate into a CRL. We assume the VC
does not changed with the length of CRL. (V C =
$1)
• Υ: The expected liability cost per certificate revo-
cation if CA delay publishing the revocation for
one day. Therefore, the risk of delaying publish-
ing a CRL of θ certificate revocations for n day
is Υ · θ · n. If we assume that for the whole pe-
riod of β, the expected liability cost that CA pays
for the accident caused by the delay of publish-
ing CRLs is Qm; (i.e.,Qm = $100, 000), then
Υ = Qm/(θ ∗ β) = $0.0087 for θ = 32, 000 and
β = 360.
• a: Recency requirement set up by the customers.
It is the max number of days between two succes-
sive CRL releasing dates that is acceptable by cus-
tomers. (a = 50days)
Because f(v) and F (v) are stable after β, CA can take
either a fixed interval strategy or a fixed CRL size strat-
egy for releasing CRL. Fundamentally these two strate-
gies are inter-exchangeable. For simplicity reason, we
present the solution for the fixed interval strategy.
If CA releases one CRL every c days, the total cost for
CA within period β is
cost(c) = [Υ · θ ·
c−1∑
n=0
n+ FC + θ · V C] · β
c
(15)
Optimization model The problem converts to the fol-
lowing optimization problem:{
min . cost(c)
s.t.FC À V C > 0,Υ> 0, c ≤ a (16)
According to Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem5[12], we get
∂[cost(c)+L(c−a)]
∂c = 0
c− a ≤ 0
L ≥ 0
L(c− a) = 0
(17)
In order for L · (c−a) = 0 to hold, it is required either
(i) L = 0 or (ii) c− a = 0. We consider case (i) and case
(ii) in the following.
Case (i) If L = 0, then{
∂[cost(c)+L(c−a)]
∂c = 0
c− a ≤ 0 (18)
Compute the first derivation of the cost with respect to c,
and get the optimal result c0:{
c0 =
√
( 2Υ )(
FC
θ + V C)
c0 ≤ a
(19)
Compute the second derivation of cost with respect to c,
and the result is
∂2cost(c)
∂c2
=
2(FC · β + θ · V C · β)
c3
(20)
Because the second derivation of cost(c) at point c0 is
∂2cost(c)
∂c2
|c=c0 =
Υ · V C · β√
( 2Υ )(
FC
θ + V C)
> 0, (21)
cost(c) reaches its minimum value at c0. The minimum
operational cost of CA is
[Υ · θ ·
c0−1∑
n=0
n+ FC + θ · V C] · β
c0
=
Υ · θ · β(c0 − 12) =
Υ · θ · β(
√
(
2
Υ
)(
FC
θ
+ V C)− 1
2
) (22)
Case (ii) If c− a = 0, the function is{
L = FC·β+θ·V C·β∆t2 − Υ·θ·β2 ≥ 0
c = a
(23)
The minimal cost of CA is fixed and equal to
[Υ · θ ·
a−1∑
n=0
n+ FC + θ · V C] · β
a
=
1
2
·Υ · θ · β · (a− 1) + β
a
(FC + θ · V C) (24)
when
a ≤
√
(
2
Υ
)(
FC
θ
+ V C) (25)
We can see that the minimum releasing interval CA
should follow is either a or c0 =
√
( 2Υ )(
FC
θ + V C)
depending on whether
√
( 2Υ )(
FC
θ + V C) is greater
than a or not. It is clear that
√
( 2Υ )(
FC
θ + V C)
is an increasing function of FC and VC, but a de-
creasing function of Υ and β, where θ = F (β) =
αb%ke−k
1−e−k [β − e
−k
1−e−k (1− e−βk)]. That means if the
fixed cost or the variable cost is higher, or the liabil-
ity cost is lower, or the issued age of the certificates is
shorter, CA should release CRLs less frequently.
Value study Now we use an empirical example to
demonstrate how much money CA can save by following
our strategy. The best waiting days to achieve the mini-
mal cost is c =
√
( 2Υ )(
FC
θ + V C) = 17.37 ≤ a = 50
days. Figure 12 shows the total cost for CA by using
different releasing strategies. If CA deviates from the
c0 = 17days by using 2 · c0 = 34days, CA ends up
spending almost $400, 000 more for just one type of cer-
tificates within a period of β. This is not a trivial number
given that there are multiple CAs providing numerous
certificate services.
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Figure 12: Total cost of CA with different releasing in-
terval after β
5.2.2 Optimal Releasing Strategy When Time is
Smaller Than β
There are two possible business scenarios for this case:
1) A “grown-up” CA that has been in CRL business for
quite a while, but faces the situation of providing CRL
services for a new type of certificates. 2) A “start-up”
CA that just begin to provide CRL services. For these
two cases, v is inside (0, β], and F (v) is a convex func-
tion with respective to v. CA can take either a fixed inter-
val or a fixed size strategy for releasing CRLs. The fixed
size means that a CA will release the CRLs whenever
the number of certificates included in the CRL exceeds a
fixed pre-specified number. Next we analyze both cases
by using simulation. For each case, CA can get the pa-
rameter estimators either based on other types of certifi-
cates it provides before or from its industry peers.
Fixed interval strategy Similar to the analysis given
for the case when time is greater than β, we can obtain
the cost function when the time is smaller than β:
cost(c) =
Υab%ke−k
1− e−k
β
c−1∑
x=0
c−1∑
n=0
(c− n)(1− e−(xc+n+1)k) +
β
c
FC + F (β)V C =
Υab%ke−k
1− e−k (βc−
β(c− 1)
2
+
((c+ 1)e−2k − ce−k + e−(c+2)k)(1− e−βk)
(1− e−k)2(1− e−ck) ) +
β
c
FC +
αb%ke−k
1− e−k [β −
e−k
1− e−k (1− e
−βk)]V C (26)
For each possible c, ranging from 1 to β, we com-
pute the total cost for CA. Figure 13 shows6 the total
cost for CA by using different releasing intervals. We
find that when c = 28 days, we get the minimal cost
$2.08603 ∗ 105. This means that when time is smaller
than β, CA should release CRLs once every 28 days.
Recall that the optimal interval is 17 days when time
is greater than β. It is easy to know that cost(17) =
$2.64014 ∗ 105 > cost(28) = $2.08603 ∗ 105 in the pe-
riod of (0, β]; therefore, CA should take different strate-
gies for time periods (0, β] and (β,+∞).
Fixed size strategy We will use the following variables
for analyzing the fixed size strategy:
• d: CA will publish a new CRL if the number of
certificate revocations exceeds d.
• q: Estimated numbers of CRLs that CA will publish
during one issued age from time 0 to β.
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Figure 13: Total cost of CA with different releasing in-
terval before β
• i: The i-th CRL published by CA, where 0 < i ≤ q.
• Ndi: CA releases the CRL on the Ndi-th day.
• F (v): Size of CRL at time v.
Then we have
F (v) =
αb%ke−k
1− e−k [v −
e−k
1− e−k (1− e
−vk)] (27)
In order to estimate Ndi, we need to compute the in-
verse function of F (v), which is denoted as G(d) (i.e.,
G(d) = F−1(v). After that, we can get the exact day
Ndi, on which CA needs to release its CRLs, by solving
Nd1 = G(d), Nd2 = G(2 ∗ d), . . . , Ndi = G(i ∗ d).
Given the LanbertW function defined as
LambertW (x) ∗ exp(LambertW (x)) = x (28)
we have
G(d) = LambertW · d(ek − 1)
· e
(− d(ek)2−2dek+d+100k
100ek
)
100ekk
+
de2k − 2dek + d+ 100k
100ekk
(29)
We conduct our simulation step by step. Firstly, for
each possible d chosen from 100 to 36, 000 (a = 1000,
b% = 10%), compute Nd1, Nd2, . . . , Ndi. Secondly,
calculate the time difference between Ndi and Ndi − 1,
which we call ci, to estimate the liability cost. Thirdly,
compute cost(d) for each individual d as following
cost(d) =
Υ · a · b% · k · e−k
1− e−k
×
q−1∑
j=0
ci−1∑
x=0
(ci − x)(1− e−((i−1)ci+x+1)k)
+ q · FC + F (β) · V C (30)
We find that the minimal cost is $2.26790 ∗ 105 when
d = 2800. The minimal cost is very similar to the result
that we obtained using the optimal fixed interval. There-
fore, when time is smaller than β, CA can take either a
fixed size strategy or a fixed interval strategy. But CA
can no longer follow the same optimal releasing interval
as in the case when time is bigger than β.
Figure 14 shows the total cost for CA to use different
size strategies. The cost for CA is minimal when d =
2800.
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Figure 15 shows the relationship between releasing
time and cumulative revocations when q = 100 and
k = 0.26 for the fixed size strategy. Here we assume
that d = 2800. That means whenever the size of CRL
reaches 2800, CA will release it. That is the reason we
see 2800, 5600, 8400, and so on along x-axils. As we
can tell, as time moves away from time 0, the releas-
ing interval between two successive CRL releasing dates
remains almost unchanged. The fixed size strategy is al-
most equivalent to the fixed interval strategy at their re-
spectively optimal points.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
x 104
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Total # of Revocations
Th
e 
ith
 R
el
ea
si
ng
 D
at
e
Figure 15: The i-th releasing day vs. cumulative revoca-
tions
To summarize, different types of CAs should take dif-
ferent CRL releasing strategies for the same type of cer-
tificate services, and the same CA should also use differ-
ent mechanisms for different types of certificate services.
6 Discussions and Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze real empirical data collected
from VeriSign to derive probability density function of
certificate revocations. Unlike most previous research,
our work is conducted based on real data. The contribu-
tions of this paper include: 1) We prove that a revoca-
tion system will become stable after a period of time;
2) CA should take different strategies when providing
certificate services for a new type of certificates versus
a re-serving type of certificates; 3) A start-up CA and
a grown-up CA should take different strategies for CRL
release; 4) We give the exact steps by which a CA can de-
rive optimal CRL releasing strategies; and 5) We prove
that a CA should release CRLs less frequently in the case
that the fixed cost is higher, the variable cost is higher, the
liability cost is lower, or the issued age of certificates is
shorter.
There are several limitations for this study. First, this
paper takes a static approach by assuming that there
is no correlation between different types of certificates,
and that customer behaviors do not affect CA’s releas-
ing strategy for deriving the optimal CRL releasing inter-
vals. A more realistic approach is to use game theory to
model the interactions between CAs and customers. Sec-
ond, this paper assumes that CA offers certificates with
a fixed issued age. To further minimize the total opera-
tional cost, CA may optimize not only the releasing time
interval but also the issued age simultaneously.
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Notes
1This work was conducted when Chengyu Ma visited Singapore
Management University
2http://sign.nca.or.kr/english/english.html
3http://www.mozilla.or.kr/zine/?cat=10
4We delete those records whose existence ages are zero.
5Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition is a necessary and sufficient opti-
mality condition for constrained optimization problems.
6For demonstration purpose, we assume that a is large enough so
that CA can adopt a fixed interval determined by any optimal value of
our model.
